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## PREFACE

Targeting is part of the tactical decision-making process used to focus the battlefield operating systems (BOSs) to achieve the commander's intent. The methodology used to translate the commander's intent into a plan is **decide, detect, deliver, and assess**. The functions associated with this methodology help the commander to decide what to attack with his fire support system, how to acquire those targets, and when those targets are found, how to attack them in a way that disrupts, delays, or limits the enemy's ability to achieve his objectives.

Targeting is a command responsibility that requires participation of key members of both the coordinating and special staffs. The commander establishes the environment that determines the quality of the targeting effort, and targeting often determines the commander's success or failure.

The targeting process is challenging. Locating, identifying, classifying, tracking, and attacking targets and assessing battle damage with limited sensor assets and attack systems is difficult. It becomes even more difficult with deep, fast-moving targets. At division and higher echelons, more decision makers and acquisition, surveillance, and attack systems are involved, making the process more complex. This is particularly true when joint and combined assets are included. Competition for assets is intense. Many intelligence systems are capable of situation development, target acquisition (TA), and battle damage assessment (BDA) but may not be able to do them at the same time. Detailed guidance, thorough planning, and disciplined execution prevent unnecessary redundancy and make the most of available combat power.

Successful targeting requires that commanders and their staffs possess--

- An understanding of the functions associated with the targeting process.
- The knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of organic and supporting TA and attack systems.
- The ability to synchronize BOS horizontally within their own command posts and vertically with higher and lower echelons.

Operation Desert Storm confirmed that the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology works. The success of the targeting effort is evident in the incredible destruction wrought by the fire support system and the relatively few American and allied casualties. This same methodology has also been effective during operations other than war as in Somalia and Haiti.

The focus of this publication is on the targeting process from task force to corps level. The process is described without tying it to specific hardware that will eventually become dated. Targeting methodology is not new or revolutionary. It consists of time-tested techniques organized in a systematic framework. Emerging joint targeting doctrinal concepts and other Services' targeting considerations are also presented.

This publication is fully compatible with Army warfighting doctrine and is consistent with current joint and combined arms doctrine. It assumes the user has a fundamental understanding of the principles of fire support set forth in field manual (FMs) 100-5 and FM 6-20, of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations set forth in FM 34-1, and of intelligence preparation of the battlefield set forth in FM 34-130.

During its development, FM 6-20-10 has undergone several draft revisions. Numerous individuals, units, and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools have helped make it an authoritative and comprehensive targeting reference. Those listed below contributed significantly and provided comprehensive rewrites of the developed draft. The effort and professionalism of these soldiers, warrant officers, and officers resulted in this final product. It reflects the consensus of the field on targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures. The following units contributed significantly to the development of this field manual:

- \* 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
- \* 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

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- \* 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York.
- \* 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.
- \* 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia.
- \* 25th Infantry Division, Schoefield Barracks, Hawaii.
- \* V Corps Artillery, Heidelberg, Germany.
- \* XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- \* U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca.
- \* U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas.
- \* U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
- \* U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- \* Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.
- \* Air Combat Command, Langley, Virginia.
- \* Air, Land, and Sea Application Center, Langley, Virginia.

The U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) owes them and many others a great debt of gratitude for the professionalism they displayed in their contributions to this important manual.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to:

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Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
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